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PROSECUTING ALLEGED TERRORISTS BY MILITARY COMMISSION:
A PRUDENT OPTION
Scott L. Silliman*
President Obama has announced that the detention facility at Guantánamo 
Bay will be closed by January 22, 2010. He has also said that at least some 
of the detainees facing criminal prosecution will be tried in military com-
missions. The system of military commissions established by President Bush 
after the 9/11 attacks, as well as the one which Congress enacted in 2006 
following the Supreme Court’s Hamdan decision, were widely criticized as 
being unproductive and not meeting international legal standards. The 
Congress has, very recently, revised the rules and procedures for military 
commissions to make them fair, effective and much more like those used for 
courts-martial. This article compares and contrasts trials in revised military 
commissions with trials in federal district courts. It concludes that a combi-
nation of both forums would best serve the President, and that military 
commissions are still a prudent option for prosecuting some detainees 
where there are security and admissibility of evidence concerns.
I. INTRODUCTION
Two months after the horrific terrorist attacks on the World Trade 
Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, then-President George 
Bush issued a Military Order which authorized the detention and trial by 
military commission of non-U.S. citizens who were members of al-Qaeda, 
who had engaged in international terrorism, or who had knowingly harbored 
individuals in either category.1
* A.B. 1965, J.D. 1968, University of North Carolina. After serving for twenty-five years 
as a uniformed judge advocate in the United States Air Force, Professor Silliman retired in 
the grade of colonel in 1993 and joined the faculty at Duke University School of Law where 
he is a Professor of the Practice of Law as well as Executive Director of Duke’s Center on 
Law, Ethics and National Security.
Some of those captured by our military 
forces in Afghanistan, or turned over to us by the Northern Alliance, were 
transferred to the U.S. Navy detention facility at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, a 
place far from the battlefield. Guantánamo Bay was chosen, in part, because 
1 Military Order, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War 
Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001) (defining those affected by the 
military order, as well as the terms of detention and trials).
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it was deemed to be outside the jurisdictional reach of the federal courts.2
The Bush Administration claimed that it had the right under the law of war 
to detain those at Guantánamo Bay until the cessation of hostilities, when-
ever that might be. The Bush Administration also claimed to be able to 
prosecute a detainee by military commission for “violations of the laws of 
war and all other offenses triable by military commission.”3 However, be-
tween November 2001 and the summer of 2006, the U.S. completed no 
military commission trials, and on June 29, 2006, the Supreme Court ruled 
in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld4 that the military commission system established by 
President Bush violated two specific provisions of the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice (UCMJ), Articles 215 and 36(b).6
The Court held that Article 21 incorporates provisions of the Gene-
va Conventions of 1949 as part of the law of war, specifically the clause of 
Common Article 3 relating to minimal judicial guarantees for prosecutions.7
Four months after the Court’s decision in Hamdan, Congress responded by 
enacting the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA).8
2 In choosing the facility at Guantánamo Bay, the Bush Administration was obviously 
relying upon the 1950 Supreme Court opinion in Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 775 
(1950), which held that enemy aliens, who were captured and held outside our territory, and 
at no relevant time and in no stage of their captivity had ever been within our territorial juris-
diction, had neither a statutory nor a constitutional right of access to our courts.
Among other ob-
jectives, the MCA sought to improve the military commission system by 
correcting many of the deficiencies delineated by the Court in Hamdan and 
by providing military commissions with a firm statutory predicate. From 
2006 until January 22, 2009, however, when President Obama directed the 
3 Dep’t of Def., Military Commissions Order No. 1, §3(B) (Aug. 31, 2005) (superseding 
an earlier version of the Order dated Mar. 21, 2002).
4 548 U.S. 557, 618–27 (2006) (elaborating on why the Bush Administration violated two 
provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice).
5 10 U.S.C. § 821 (2006) (stating that “the provisions of this chapter conferring jurisdic-
tion upon courts-martial do not deprive military commissions, provost courts, or other mili-
tary tribunals of concurrent jurisdiction with respect to offenders and offenses that by statute 
or by the law of war may be tried by military commissions, provost courts, or other military 
tribunals.”) (emphasis added)).
6 Id. § 836(b) (declaring that the President shall ensure that “[a]ll rules and regulations 
made under this article shall be uniform insofar as practicable . . . .”).
7 Under Common Article 3, it is prohibited to have “the passing of sentences and the 
carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted 
court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized 
peoples.” Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3(i)(d), Aug. 
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
8 Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (providing statutory definitions, guidelines, and 
jurisdictional boundaries for the U.S. military commissions).
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suspension of any further military commission proceedings,9 the U.S. com-
pleted only three trials.10 In the Spring of 2009, the Obama administration 
made some changes to military commission procedures,11 and the President 
has indicated his intent to use military commissions for prosecuting at least 
some of the detainees.12 In furtherance of the President’s decision, Congress 
recently amended the MCA to make the military commission system fairer 
and more effective.13 Many argue, however, that those detainees for whom 
there is some evidence of criminality should be tried in the federal district 
courts rather than in military commissions because of the stigma attached to 
the hearings already conducted at Guantánamo.14
This article assesses prosecuting the detainees in federal district 
courts and military commissions. It compares and contrasts each, and argues 
Which, then, is the better 
prosecutorial forum to use?
9 Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897, 4899 (Jan. 22, 2009) (halting all Guantá-
namo proceedings pending in the United States Court of Military Commission Review).
10 David Hicks pled guilty, in accordance with a pretrial agreement, to providing material 
support to terrorism. See LAW COUNCIL OF AUSTRALIA, SUMMARY OF THE REPORT OF THE 
INDEPENDENT OBSERVER FOR THE LAW COUNCIL OF AUSTRALIA: DAVID HICKS V. THE UNITED 
STATES 4–5 (July 24, 2007), available at http://www.lawcouncil.asn.au/shadomx/
apps/fms/fmsdownload.cfm?file_uuid=CDFB40A7-1E4F-17FA-D2F7C11559D3CAC7&site
Name=lca. He was convicted and sentenced to serve nine months of confinement (in Austral-
ia), with seven years of further confinement suspended. Id. Salim Hamdan, Osama Bin La-
den’s driver, was acquitted of conspiracy but convicted of providing material support for 
terrorism. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 570 (2006). He was sentenced to serve 
sixty-six months of confinement but was credited with sixty-one months already served 
while awaiting trial. See Carol J. Williams, The Nation: Yemeni Gets 5 1/2 Years in Prison 
with Credit for Time Already Served, Osama bin Laden’s Driver Should Complete His Sen-
tence by January, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2008, at A1. Finally, Ali Hamza Ahmad Suliman al 
Bahlul was convicted of conspiring with al-Qaeda, solicitation to commit murder of pro-
tected persons and other specified offenses, and providing material support for terrorism. 
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Defense News Release No. 926-08, Detainee Convicted of 
Terrorism Charge at Military Commission Trial (Nov. 3, 2008), available at 
http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=12329 [hereinafter News Re-
lease]. He was sentenced to life imprisonment. Id.
11 See Memorandum from Jeh C. Johnson, Gen. Counsel of the Dep’t of Def., to Robert 
Gates, Sec’y of Def., Changes to the Manual for Military Commissions (May 13, 2009) ((1) 
declaring statements obtained by interrogation methods constituting cruel, inhuman or de-
grading treatment to be inadmissible in evidence; (2) reversing the burden of proof with 
regards to the admissibility of hearsay evidence; and (3) granting more flexibility to an ac-
cused in the selection of military defense counsel).
12 William Glaberson, Obama to Keep Tribunals; Stance Angers Some Backers, N.Y.
TIMES, May 15, 2009, at A1.
13 Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, §§ 1801–07, 123 Stat. 2190
(2009).
14 See, e.g., The Constitution Project, Guantánamo Detainees Should be Transferred to 
U.S. for Prosecution by Federal Courts, Aug 3, 2009, available at http://www.
constitutionproject.org/newsdetail.asp?id=402 (last visited Oct 7, 2009). 
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that recent legislation revising the rules and procedures for military com-
missions makes that forum a prudent option to be used in combination with 
the federal district courts.
II. ASSESSING THE TWO FORUMS
A. The Federal District Courts
High profile terrorism cases, such as the trials of Zacarias Mous-
saoui and José Padilla, have, in the past, been successfully prosecuted in the 
federal district courts. Additionally, at least one of the detainees, Ahmed 
Ghailani, has already been moved to New York and charged with offenses 
in connection to the 1998 bombings of our embassies in Kenya and Tanza-
nia.15 For other potential cases, there are numerous “terrorism” crimes 
available for U.S. attorneys to use in criminal prosecutions, most notably 
those statutes which proscribe providing material support for terrorists and 
providing material support to a foreign terrorist organization.16
However, prosecuting a large number of the Guantánamo Bay de-
tainees in the federal district courts would involve unique challenges. As-
suming that some of the potential evidence in many cases would be highly 
classified, the trial judge would need a Sensitive Compartmented Informa-
tion Facility (SCIF)17
15 Peter Finn, Guantánamo Bay Detainee Brought to U.S. for Trial, WASH. POST, June 11, 
2009, at A1.
when reading the classified documents and for secure-
ly storing the evidence when trial is not in session. Additionally, in order to 
assist the judge during trial, law clerks would need to have the requisite 
security clearances, a process which often takes months to accomplish. En-
suring court security and guaranteeing the safety of witnesses and jurors 
would also require significant additional resources. For example, when deal-
ing with very high profile cases such as Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, it is not 
16 See 18 U.S.C. § 2339(A) (2006) (providing that it is illegal to provide material support 
to terrorists) and § 2339(B) (providing that it is illegal to provide material support to foreign 
terrorist organizations). See also id. § 2332 (declaring that homicide occurs when someone 
kills a national of the U.S. abroad); id. § 2332(a) (declaring imprisonment for anyone who 
uses, threatens, or conspires to use a weapon of mass destruction against a U.S. national); id. 
§ 2332(b) (declaring that acts of terrorism transcend national boundaries); id. § 2339(C)
(prohibiting the financing of terrorism); id. § 2339(D) (stating that it is illegal to receive 
military training from foreign terrorist organizations); id. §§ 884, 992, 924 (pertaining to
explosives offenses); id. § 956 (pertaining to conspiracy to murder, kidnap or maim persons, 
or to damage property overseas); id. § 1203 (declaring it is illegal to take hostages).
17 See Office of the Inspector General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Processing Classified Infor-
mation on Portable Computers in the Department of Justice, Audit Report 05-32 (July 2005),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/reports/plus/a0532/intro.htm (“A SCIF is an accre-
dited area, room, group of rooms, buildings, or installation where Sensitive Compartmented 
Information may be stored, used, discussed, and electronically processed.”).
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inconceivable that terrorist cells operating within the U.S. would target the 
courtroom and prisoner detention facility where he would be kept during 
trial proceedings.
There are evidentiary challenges as well in using the federal district 
courts to prosecute the Guantánamo Bay detainees. Statements taken from 
the detainees during their initial capture might be inadmissible either be-
cause they were taken under coercive conditions or because no advice of 
rights was given.18
There may be specific challenges which arise during pretrial dis-
covery with regard to exculpatory material in the government’s possession1
An admission made while a weapon is pointed directly 
at the detainee could hardly be considered free of coercion; and on the bat-
tlefield, the soldier’s mission is to kill or capture the enemy, not to gather 
evidence for a criminal prosecution. 
9
or written statements made by potential government witnesses.20 The gov-
ernment must release this information if the detainee requests it.21 If such 
material is classified, as would generally be the case, then, under the Classi-
fied Information Procedures Act (CIPA), the trial judge may conduct an in 
camera hearing to determine the use, relevance, or admissibility of the evi-
dence.22 In this situation, the determination of relevance may be difficult to 
make because the trial judge is acting outside the adversarial process and 
without the benefit of knowing how the detainee intends to proceed with his 
defense. If the classified material sought by the detainee is deemed relevant 
by the trial judge, and the government’s offered unclassified substitutes or 
summaries are ruled inadequate, then the prosecution faces the dilemma of 
either having to produce the material, accept sanctions imposed by the trial 
judge, or forego prosecuting the detainee.23
Although the full scope of a detainee’s constitutional protection 
beyond habeas corpus has not yet been ascertained, if the Sixth Amendment 
right to a speedy trial applies, prosecuting detainees who have been kept at 
Guantánamo Bay for five, six or more years may also prove to be a chal-
18 See Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 495 (1972) (“Just as we do not convict when there 
is a reasonable doubt of guilt, we should not permit the prosecution to introduce into evi-
dence a defendant’s confession when there is a reasonable doubt that it was the product of his 
free and rational choice.”).
19 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
20 See Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
21 See 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (2006) (pertaining to demands for production of statements and 
reports of witnesses).
22 18 U.S.C.A. app. 3 § 6(a) (2000).
23 ABA STANDING COMM. ON LAW & NAT’L SEC., POST WORKSHOP REPORT—TRYING 
TERRORISTS IN ARTICLE III COURTS: CHALLENGES AND LESSONS LEARNED, at 13 (July 2009),
available at http://www.abanet.org/natsecurity/trying_terrorists_artIII_report_final.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 7, 2009).
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lenge. The Supreme Court has held that a delay of over eight years in prose-
cuting a drug dealer was clearly sufficient to trigger a speedy trial violation 
where the government was the cause of the delay.24
B. Revised Military Commissions
Although prosecuting the detainees in military commissions using 
the newly revised rules and procedures might be subject to some of the 
same challenges facing trials in the federal district courts, military commis-
sion prosecutions offer some distinct advantages. A military commission, 
like the more traditional court-martial, is “portable,” meaning that it may be 
held anywhere,25
A military commission is also an extremely efficient trial forum. As 
in the case of courts-martial, there is seldom any period of lengthy delay in 
a military commission between a conviction and the decision on sentencing 
since attorneys for both the government and the detainee must be prepared 
at the outset to proceed through the findings and sentencing phases of the 
trial. Also, unless Congress chooses to incorporate the court-martial re-
quirement for a formal pretrial investigation2
thereby obviating the security risks of holding trials in 
New York, Washington, or other metropolitan centers in this country. Even 
after the detention facility at Guantánamo Bay is closed, military commis-
sions could readily be convened at any American military installation in the 
world, regardless of where the alleged offense took place or where the ac-
cused is detained. Since the trial would take place within a military facility, 
the active duty armed forces could provide an extremely high level of secu-
rity in a manner which would be virtually impossible in a civilian communi-
ty. If a military commission convicted and sentenced a detainee to any pe-
riod of confinement, that detainee could serve the sentence at any location 
under military control.
6
The speedy trial issue arises because many of the detainees have 
been held at Guantánamo Bay for years without criminal charges being 
brought against them. The amended MCA specifically makes inapplicable 
the court-martial speedy trial rule under the UCMJ which provides that an 
accused should be brought to trial within one hundred and twenty days after 
—the equivalent of a grand 
jury—into military commission rules, a criminal charge can be referred to 
trial by a military commission in a relatively short period of time. 
24 See Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (1992).
25 See 10 U.S.C. § 805 (2006) (“[The Uniform Code of Military Justice] applies in all 
places.”).
26 Id. § 832(a) (“No charge or specification may be referred to a general court-martial for 
trial until a thorough and impartial investigation of all the matters set forth therein has been 
made.”).
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the imposition of pretrial restraint.27
Under the revised military commission procedures, the jury panel 
makes the decision as to guilt or innocence and, upon conviction, deter-
mines the sentence.2
The question of whether any constitu-
tional speedy trial protection extends to the detainees remains unanswered.
8 Except when considering a capital charge, the jury 
panel need only have a minimum of five members,29 and the panel’s com-
position differs significantly from a federal jury in that it is comprised sole-
ly of commissioned officers who are chosen because they meet certain qua-
lifications.30 It is also highly likely that all members of the panel would hold 
some level of security clearance, and this would facilitate consideration of 
any classified material which might be introduced into evidence. As to ap-
pellate review under the new legislation, once the convening authority ap-
proves a finding of guilt, the case is referred to a Court of Military Commis-
sion Review (CMCR) which is comprised of appellate military judges.31
What is significant about the scope of review for the CMCR is that it in-
cludes determinations of both law and fact,32
27 Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 802, 123 Stat. 2190 (2009)
(to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 948(b)(d)(1)) (“The following provisions of this title shall not 
apply to trial by military commission under this chapter: (A) Section 810 (Article 10 of the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice), relating to speedy trial, including any rule of court-
martial relating to speedy trial . . . .”). See 10 U.S.C. § 810; Manual for Courts-Martial, Unit-
ed States, at II-71, R.C.M. § 707(a) (2008), available at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/
awcgate/law/mcm.pdf (containing Executive Orders, the most current being Exec. Order No. 
13,447, 72 Fed. Reg. 56179 (Sep. 28, 2007), through which the President exercises the au-
thority vested in him by Congress in Articles 36 and 56 of the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice (10 U.S.C. §§ 836, 856) to prescribe rules of procedure for courts-martial and to 
establish maximum punishments for offenses).
thus permitting the appellate 
court to set aside a conviction based upon a finding of insufficient evidence 
28 Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 949(l)(a), (m)(a), 123 Stat.
2190 (2009). Interestingly, a military commission may convict a detainee, except for death 
cases, upon a vote of only two-thirds of the panel. Id. § 949(m)(a). Sentencing requires only 
a two-thirds vote for imprisonment up to ten years and a three-fourths vote for sentences 
which are more than ten years up to life imprisonment, but a unanimous vote is required for a 
death sentence and the jury panel must be comprised of twelve members. Id. § 949(m)(a), 
(b)(2), (c)(1). This is identical to what is required in courts-martial under the Uniform Code 
of Military Justice. See 10 U.S.C. § 852(a), (b).
29 See Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, §§ 948(m)(a), 949(m)(c), 
123 Stat. 2190 (2009).
30 Id. § 948(i)(a)–(b) (stating that “[a]ny commissioned officer of the armed forces on 
active duty is eligible to serve on a military commission under this chapter” and that “[w]hen 
convening a military commission . . . the convening authority shall detail as members of the 
commission such members of the armed forces eligible under subsection (a), as in the opi-
nion of the convening authority, are best qualified for the duty by reason of age, education, 
training, experience, length of service, and judicial temperament.”).
31 Id. § 950(f)(a), (b).
32 Id. § 950(d).
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to support the jury panel’s verdict. The model for this expanded scope of 
appellate review is the service courts of criminal appeal, the highest appel-
late courts in each of the armed services for review of courts-martial.33 Fol-
lowing action by the CMCR, a detainee may petition for further review in 
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit and then to the 
Supreme Court.34
There is one particular issue with regard to using revised military 
commissions which remains unresolved. Under the new legislation, “ma-
terial support for terrorism,” a crime codified in 18 U.S.C. 2339(a) and (b), 
is deemed to be a violation of the law of war—the traditional subject matter 
jurisdiction of a military commission—and listed among the offenses which 
may be prosecuted by military commission.35 Whether material support for 
terrorism constitutes a recognized violation of the law of war will, in large 
part, depend upon how the courts interpret the scope of Congress’ authority 
to define violations of the law of war in a statute.36 If a court rules that the 
offense is not a violation of the law of war, and is therefore outside the sub-
ject matter jurisdiction of military commissions, such offenses could be 
prosecuted only in the federal district courts. The resolution of this issue 
may come when the case of Ali Hamza Ahmad Suliman al Bahlul, who 
along with Salim Hamdan was convicted of material support for terrorism,37
III. CONCLUSION
reaches its final stage of appeal.
As mentioned earlier, the Obama Administration has signaled its in-
tention to prosecute alleged terrorists using a combination of the federal 
district courts and military commissions operating under revised rules of 
procedure. There will be cases where security reasons or evidence admissi-
bility problems make it more advisable to use military commissions. On the 
other hand, in the event it is ruled that the crime of material support for ter-
rorism can only be prosecuted in the federal district courts, then the difficul-
ties of using a military forum are obvious. The Administration should not be 
reticent, though, to use military commissions to prosecute those at Guantá-
namo Bay whenever possible. Now that Congress has revised the rules and 
procedures to make them adhere more closely to the protections afforded to 
33 See 10 U.S.C. § 866(c).
34 Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 950(g)(a)(e), 123 Stat. 2190
(2009).
35 See id. §§ 950(p)(d), (t)(25).
36 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (stating that Congress has authority “[t]o define and punish 
Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations.” 
(emphasis added)).
37 See News Release, supra note 10.
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our own service personnel under the UCMJ, there is a greater probability 
that military commissions will be upheld in the courts and, notwithstanding 
their early notoriety, accepted by the American people and the global com-
munity.38
38 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 632–33 (2006) (holding that courts-martial 
under the UCMJ meet the requirements of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, 
whereas the system of military commissions at issue in the case did not). The case noted:
The Government offers only a cursory defense of Hamdan’s military commission 
in light of Common Article 3. As Justice Kennedy explains, that defense fails be-
cause “[t]he regular military courts in our system are the courts-martial established 
by congressional statutes.” At a minimum, a military commission “can be ‘regular-
ly constituted’ by the standards of our military justice system only if some practical 
need explains deviations from court-martial practice.”
Id. at 785–86 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part) (citations omitted) (alteration in original).
